The issues surrounding the Adani Group and its deals in Kenya may be briefly absent from the front pages, but you can rest assured that they are not over. The Adani saga may look like the story of an Indian conglomerate with designs on making money in Kenya. The business has used less than transparent means and the connivance of well-heeled brokers and government officials.
However, I believe there may be more to the story than meets the eye, and the ties between the Adani Group, specifically Gautam Adani and India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi, play a significant part in the whole affair.
It is no secret that India, especially under Modi, has strategic national ambitions that involve the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) which includes the East African coastline from Somalia down to Mozambique, and island nations such as Mauritius.
A friend of mine and I have been a little obsessed with the Adani Group issue, and our discussions – based on publicly available information – have led me to suspect there is a bigger game at play than what is on the surface.
A recent conversation was sparked by this report on the BBC website. The report is about the tiny Indian Ocean island of Agalega, home to 350 people – mainly fishers and coconut farmers. Agalega is part of the Mauritius Archipelago and is 1,100 km north of Port Louis, the capital.
The BBC article highlights the fact that in 2015, Mauritius signed a deal enabling India to build a vast 3,000-metre runway as well as a big new jetty, as part of the two countries’ deepening collaboration on maritime security.
It has emerged that some Agalegans fear this could grow into a fully fledged military presence as Agalega – two small islands covering 25 sq km – would be an ideal location for India to monitor marine traffic.
They are not alone. In a 2021 article titled “Naval-gazing in the Indian Ocean: Why Africa should worry”, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) said, “Even the notion of an Indian military facility on Mauritius’s Agalega Island deserves regional and AU attention.”
The think-tank refers to the Agalega facility as a “surveillance station” and says it is likely to contain a coastal radar surveillance system similar to Indian-built equipment elsewhere in Mauritius.
The Adani Group’s connections with Mauritius go back to at least 2010. In September 2023, the Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) reported that millions of dollars were invested in Adani Group stocks through funds based in Mauritius.
I believe that looking at the Adani Group deals in isolation from India’s strategic ambitions is not allowing us to see the bigger picture. We need to acknowledge that India has very serious plans when it comes to the Indian Ocean.
As such, when it comes to Adani, we have been asking the wrong questions and in fact should be wondering what India is up to. For instance, is the Adani Group Modi’s and India’s stalking horse to pursue India’s strategic ambitions in the IOR? In which case, have we been playing draughts while Modi and India are playing chess?
My musings have sent me down a rabbit hole of questions and I have found some interesting things. First I wanted to know exactly what the relationship between Modi and Gautam Adani was. Elsewhere, the well-recorded relationship between Modi and Adani has generated significant attention due to the alignment of Modi’s foreign policy initiatives with the global expansion of Adani’s business empire.
Reading through articles addressing the crony capitalism angle in both English edition of Le Monde Diplomatique and the CLS Blue Sky Blog, I found that both Modi and Adani hail from Gujarat, and their association dates back to Modi’s tenure as Gujarat’s Chief Minister. It was in Gujarat where Modi implemented pro-business policies that facilitated the growth of Adani’s enterprises. This connection has continued into Modi’s national leadership, raising questions about whether Modi’s foreign diplomacy benefits Adani’s business ventures. Under Modi’s administration, the Adani Group has won major contracts, both domestically and internationally.
Critics argue that Modi’s foreign policy trips often open doors for Adani, creating favourable conditions for the group’s projects in countries such as Bangladesh, Israel, Kenya, and Tanzania. For instance, Adani’s ventures in ports, energy, and agriculture align closely with the Modi government’s strategic goals, making Adani a “national champion” capable of advancing these goals abroad while benefiting from Modi’s influence. A prime example is Adani’s ability to secure contracts for projects in Bangladesh, supported by high-level diplomatic engagements.
Further, reports in The Independent suggest that regulatory changes under Modi’s government have occasionally eased business pathways for Adani, such as the 2019 rule modifications allowing Adani to operate six airports in India despite lacking prior experience in the aviation sector.
While Adani attributes his success to longstanding policy shifts and denies receiving preferential treatment, analysts argue that Modi’s government provides implicit support to his ventures by shaping policies that indirectly benefit the conglomerate. These observations contribute to ongoing debates about “crony capitalism” in India.
Even though Adani dismisses these allegations as baseless, critics see his rapid ascent as indicative of India’s broader issues with corporate governance, where the boundaries between government interests and private gains remain ambiguous.
So what are India’s strategic ambitions in the Indian Ocean Region and how do these affect its relations with African nations such as Mauritius, Kenya, Tanzania, and Somalia? Also, where do China, the USA, and Russia come into the equation?
Reading through various articles published in The Diplomat, Pacific Affairs (UBC Journal), and the Indian Council of World Affairs, I made some interesting observations.
For a start, India’s strategic ambitions in the IOR are closely tied to securing its economic interests, safeguarding trade routes, enhancing regional influence, and counterbalancing the presence of other powers, particularly China. This approach impacts its relationships with African nations along the Indian Ocean coast, like Mauritius, Kenya, Tanzania, and Somalia, as these nations also play important roles in broader geopolitical dynamics.
In its mission to enhance diplomatic and economic ties with nations on East Africa’s Indian Ocean seaboard India has used partnerships in security, trade, and the blue economy. For instance, India’s Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) initiative strengthens regional collaboration on maritime safety and economic development.
In the case of Kenya, India has expanded its defence cooperation to include maritime security, tackling issues like illegal fishing, piracy, and maritime terrorism. This partnership is also advancing Kenya’s blue economy initiatives, aligning with India’s own goals of promoting sustainable ocean resource utilisation.
Meanwhile according to articles in Pacific Affairs (UBC Journal) and South Asian Voices, India is keen on countering China’s influence. The two publications note that China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has expanded its presence in the Indian Ocean, with significant investments in African ports and infrastructure. This development poses a challenge to India’s influence, as countries like Kenya and Mauritius receive considerable Chinese funding.
India aims to offer a viable alternative to China through investments in infrastructure, defence training, and economic collaboration that align with the priorities of IOR nations through partnerships beyond Chinese investment and influence.
India is not alone in this quest in the IOR. According to articles in both The Diplomat and the Indian Council of World Affairs, India is leveraging its strategic partnerships with the USA and Russia to balance China’s presence.
For example, the USA’s Indo-Pacific Strategy aligns with India’s goals to ensure free and open navigation in the IOR, and both countries frequently participate in joint exercises to enhance maritime security.
Such dynamics reflect India’s growing role as a stabilising force in the IOR while navigating complex relations with major global powers.
Taking the above into consideration, I seriously doubt the moves by the Adani Group in Kenya and Tanzania, for example, are just a coincidence at a time when India is seeking to expand its strategic and military influence in the IOR.
The Inventiva publication makes it clear that the Adani Group’s expansion into critical infrastructure in countries like Kenya and Tanzania highlights this alignment and shows that infrastructure projects can serve dual commercial and strategic roles, enhancing India’s economic influence in these key locations.
For instance, in Kenya, Adani sought substantial investments in the energy sector involving high-voltage power lines to modernise the energy grid, essential for industrial growth and energy access in rural areas.
The controversial interest in a concession for Nairobi’s Jomo Kenyatta International Airport, which sparked local debates and protests over foreign control of vital infrastructure, was another example.
Similarly, in Tanzania, according to an article in Corporate NTU, Adani Ports has secured a 30-year concession for the Dar es Salaam port’s Container Terminal 2. This investment positions India as a significant player in East African trade, with Tanzania becoming India’s second-largest African trading partner and, according to an article in IASbaba, competing with Chinese-funded initiatives in Africa.
This “infrastructure diplomacy” approach, where companies like Adani support India’s strategic goals by establishing infrastructure in key international locations, mirrors tactics used by China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
Such investments boost India’s ability to assert influence in the IOR, leveraging corporate-led infrastructure projects that double as strategic footholds. To me, this proves that the Adani Group’s projects are a part of India’s efforts to counterbalance China’s expanding influence across the Indian Ocean and Africa.
Of course, none of this is unique to India and there are more than enough examples globally of states using national private commercial and industrial interests to win friends and influence the public while furthering their ambitions by acting as proxies for state power and strategic ambition.
The following examples demonstrate how countries strategically deploy private and state-backed corporations to pursue broader geopolitical ambitions, blending economic investments with political and sometimes military objectives. This approach, often called “state capitalism”, is increasingly common as countries seek influence in global markets and critical infrastructure.
So China has its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) which epitomizes infrastructure-led diplomacy, where state-backed firms such as China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) and China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) build roads, ports, railways, and energy infrastructure across Asia, Africa, and Europe.
The US has its Silicon Valley tech giants such as Google, Facebook, and Microsoft, which often align their global strategies with US interests. For example, Google’s massive investments in global internet infrastructure, like the Equiano undersea cable connecting Africa to Europe, enhance internet connectivity while providing the US with influence over information flows. Additionally, US government agencies sometimes collaborate with tech firms on cybersecurity and intelligence, especially in regions of strategic importance.
Russia has what some have labelled its Energy Diplomacy in Europe. So, for instance you have Russian state-owned energy giant Gazprom, which is central to Russia’s influence in Europe. Through natural gas pipelines like Nord Stream and TurkStream, Russia can exert economic and political pressure on dependent countries, especially during times of geopolitical tension.
There is also France and its use of TotalEnergies in Africa. TotalEnergies (formerly Total) has a longstanding presence, particularly in oil-rich regions like Nigeria, Angola, and Mozambique. France’s involvement often includes diplomatic support and, at times, military presence to secure these interests.
Finally, there is Japan’s exertion of soft power through infrastructure and aid – you have the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) funding infrastructure projects that are often implemented by Japanese corporations in a bid to create goodwill.
The unmistakeable strengthening of India’s relationship with the countries of the IOR speaks to its significance in India’s seaboard diplomacy in eastern Africa.
As I have shown, India has invested in these nations through trade, security cooperation, and infrastructure development, and consolidated relationships through defence agreements involving naval exercises and joint port development projects.
It is this, aided by the Adani Group’s investments, that will contribute to India’s attempt to carve a sphere of influence in East Africa, where China has also been quite active in infrastructure investment.
In the final analysis, however, India’s ambitions in the Indian Ocean align with its desire to secure trade, enhance regional influence, and counter China’s growing presence. It is this strategy that has strengthened its relationships with African nations along the Indian Ocean seaboard, especially Mauritius, Kenya, and Tanzania, which share mutual security and economic interests with India.
The involvement of China, the USA, and, to a lesser extent, Russia, adds layers of complexity, making the Indian Ocean a critical arena of strategic rivalry where India seeks to assert its influence while managing relationships with these powers.
