Indian businessman sentenced for sending sensitive US technology to Russia
Islamabad: Sanjay Kaushik, a 58-year-old businessman from Delhi, India, was sentenced to 30 months (2.5 years) in federal prison, followed by 36 months of supervised release.
According to Kashmir Media Service, this sentencing occurred in US District Court in Portland, Oregon, on or around January 15-16, 2026 (announced publicly on January 16, 2026, by the US Department of Justice). The presiding judge was US District Judge Karin J. Immergut.
US Enforcement Against Illegal Transfers of Sensitive Technology Focus on Indian-Linked Cases and Broader Scrutiny of Re-Export Networks.
US authorities, including the Department of Justice (DOJ), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), continue to intensify scrutiny of networks particularly those involving India-based entities that facilitate the re-export or diversion of US-origin controlled technologies, especially dual-use items with military applications, to sanctioned or restricted countries such as Russia and China.
This enforcement is driven by national security concerns, including evasion of US export controls, sanctions regimes (e.g., related to Russia’s actions in Ukraine), and restrictions on advanced technologies like aviation, navigation systems, stealth, and defense-related information.
A recent high-profile case exemplifies this trend: Indian national Sanjay Kaushik, a 58-year-old businessman from Delhi, was sentenced in the U.S. District Court in Portland, Oregon, to 30 months in federal prison followed by 36 months of supervised release (sentencing announced around January 15-16, 2026, by Judge Karin J. Immergut).
Kaushik pleaded guilty on October 9, 2025, to one count of conspiracy to violate the Export Control Reform Act and Export Administration Regulations. He was indicted in November 2024 on additional counts including attempted illegal export and false statements.
Scheme Details: From September 2023 onward, Kaushik conspired to illegally obtain and export US-origin aviation components and sensitive navigation/flight control technology (e.g., an Attitude and Heading Reference System or similar dual-use air navigation system). He misrepresented the end user as his Indian company to an Oregon supplier, but the items were routed through India to Russia, circumventing US sanctions and controls on sensitive tech to Russia.
Arrest and Context: Arrested in Miami, Florida, on October 17, 2024; in custody since. U.S. Attorney Scott E. Bradford described it as a “calculated, profit-driven scheme” involving coordination with foreign co-conspirators, including potentially sanctioned Russian entities.
This case fits into a pattern of U.S. actions targeting circumvention of Indian networks, with increased focus for re-exports to Russia (via shadow fleets, third-party distributors) and China (e.g., advanced computing, semiconductors).
Several prior or concurrent cases highlight US concerns over mishandling or transfer of sensitive defense/national security information by individuals with Indian backgrounds:
Noshir Sheriarji Gowadia (Indian-born US citizen, former B-2 bomber engineer): Convicted in 2010 in the US District Court for the District of Hawaii on 14 of 17 charges, including espionage, violating the Arms Export Control Act, money laundering, and filing false tax returns. He sold classified stealth missile and aircraft technology information (related to the B-2 bomber’s propulsion and infrared suppression) to China, as well as to entities in Germany, Israel, and Switzerland. Sentenced in January 2011 to 32 years in federal prison. His conviction was upheld on appeal in 2014.
Ashley J. Tellis (prominent Indian-origin US defence and foreign policy analyst, expert on South Asian affairs and US-India relations): Arrested on October 11, 2025, in Virginia. Charged with unlawful retention of national defense information (under 18 U.S.C. § 793). As a senior unpaid adviser at the State Department and contractor for the Pentagon’s Office of Net Assessment (with Top Secret/SCI clearance), he allegedly removed over 1,000 pages of classified documents (including SECRET and TOP SECRET materials on Air Force tactics/techniques) from government facilities and stored them at his Vienna, Virginia, home. FBI searches recovered these in filing cabinets and trash bags. Some reports allege meetings with Chinese officials and passing envelopes, though the primary charge is unlawful retention (not yet espionage/transmission). He faced detention hearings in the Eastern District of Virginia; potential penalty up to 10 years.
Samarth Agrawal: Convicted in 2010 (trial in Southern District of New York; sentenced February 2011) under the Economic Espionage Act (18 U.S.C. § 1832) and related statutes. As a former quantitative analyst at Société Générale in New York, he stole proprietary high-frequency trading computer code (trade secrets) with intent to use/sell it (e.g., to Tower Research Capital). Sentenced to 36 months in prison. This case involved economic espionage in the financial sector rather than military/defense tech, but it was prosecuted under the same EEA framework used in tech export violation cases.
These incidents including re-export hubs like India for dual-use goods to Russia (e.g., electronics, aviation parts) and China (e.g., semiconductors, advanced tech), insider risks from individuals with access to classified U.S. defense information and evolving enforcement: BIS and DOJ prioritize violations amid expanded sanctions, with civil penalties, criminal prosecutions, and secondary measures (e.g., tariffs on nations buying Russian energy), underscore heightened US vigilance against India:
Broader Implications and EU Parallels
The European Union has similarly targeted India-based networks for facilitating Russia’s access to restricted dual-use technologies (e.g., CNC machine tools, microelectronics, UAV components), sanctioning multiple Indian firms in packages such as the 19th (October 2025), which included three companies (Aerotrust Aviation Private Limited, Ascend Aviation India Private Limited, and Shree Enterprises) for allegedly enabling circumvention of export restrictions to support Russia’s military-industrial complex.
Additional Indian entities have faced EU export restrictions or scrutiny in earlier packages (e.g., Si2 Microsystems in 2024). The EU shares intelligence with India on violators and monitors third-country evasion, mirroring U.S. concerns over transshipment routes.
Indians will do the same to EU — similar India-based networks and individuals are increasingly scrutinized and sanctioned by the EU for enabling re-exports of sensitive dual-use technologies to Russia (and potentially other restricted destinations), often involving circumvention of EU export controls on items like electronics and machinery.
Sources: US Department of Justice press releases (Kaushik, Tellis, Gowadia cases), court records, BIS enforcement updates, EU Council statements on sanctions packages, reports from India Today, The Hindu, Economic Times, Al Jazeera, Bloomberg, Financial Times, and others (as of January 2026). This reflects ongoing multilateral efforts by the US and EU to safeguard sensitive technologies from unauthorized foreign access and sanctions evasion.
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