RSS and the Peace Paradox in India and Pakistan
Dr. Waleed Rasool
The enduring silence between India and Pakistan has often resembled a hardened wall of distrust—constructed through wars, reinforced by political narratives, and sustained by unresolved grievances. Yet strategists repeatedly demonstrate that even the extreme hardline softens cracks from within. The essential question today is not whether dialogue between the two nuclear neighbors is necessary; rather, it is who will “bell the cat” and take the politically difficult first step toward breaking the stony silence.
Recent discussions emerging from sections of the RashtriyaSwayamsevakSangh—India’s ideological powerhouse associated with Hindu nationalism—have generated cautious optimism among strategic observers. For decades, it remained a common perception among Indian intelligentsia that meaningful political openings toward Pakistan would only emerge from the hyper-nationalist circles themselves. The reasoning was simple: political actors who cultivate nationalist rhetoric possess greater domestic legitimacy to soften positions without immediately being labelled weak. If hostility was intensified by hardliners, perhaps reconciliation too may begin from within those same circles.
Whether such statements are part of a broader political design remains uncertain. In diplomacy, however, intent is often secondary to action. As scholars of international politics remind us, political outcomes are shaped less by rhetoric and more by sustained behavioral shifts. The challenge, therefore, lies not in decoding hidden intentions but in identifying whether a meaningful diplomatic window has begun to emerge.
Since the constitutional changes of August 2019, when India revoked the special status of Indian illegally occupied Jammu and Kashmir through the abrogation of Articles 370 and 35A, relations between India and Pakistan entered one of their coldest phases. For many in Pakistan, the move represented a decisive departure from bilateralism to unilateralism, deepening what may be termed a “mega trust deficit.” India’s subsequent bifurcation of the region into Union Territories further intensified regional anxieties and its recurrence and repercussions had been observed till date.
From a political communication perspective, the success of the ruling dispensation in India can partly be explained through the lens of the Agenda Setting module of Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw argued that media may not dictate what citizens think, but profoundly shapes “what they think about”. The extensive investment in nationalist media narratives enabled the political leadership to cultivate public jubilation around Kashmir, framing the constitutional move as a historic triumph and consolidating electoral legitimacy. So the same mantra to avoid, delay and linger the Kashmir dispute.
Yet triumphalist narratives often obscure deeper structural realities. Data demonstrates that every major peace cycle between India and Pakistan eventually collapsed around the unresolved question of Kashmir. The period from 1947 to 1965 witnessed relative engagement before conflict erupted. The post-Tashkent Declaration phase saw hopes of normalization, only for mistrust to deepen amid the 1971 crisis and the creation of Bangladesh. The post-Simla Agreement optimism similarly deteriorated, while the occupation of Siachen in 1984 widened the strategic divide.
The late 1980s represented another missed opportunity. Had the people of IIOJK been provided greater political space following the disputed 1987 elections, the trajectory may perhaps have unfolded differently, instead, an extended cycle of armed struggle,militarization, displacement, and human suffering engulfed the region, consuming immense human and material resources.
Still, history offers lessons. As strategic scholars frequently observe, conflicts produce either gains, losses, or learning. If we learned from repeated failures, then there remains hope for a new diplomatic grammar. Atal Bihari Vajpayee famously remarked that while friends may change, neighbours cannot. Geography ultimately imposes realism upon politics.
Ironically, both India and Pakistan share overlapping historical experiences of alliance politics. During the Cold War, Pakistan allied with Western security arrangements such as CENTO and SEATO, while India cultivated strategic partnerships with USSR despite be the part of the non alignment movement. . Today, India enjoys close relations with the United States, yet strategic realities continue to evolve in a changing Asian order. The lesson is unmistakable: external alignments cannot substitute for regional peace.
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Equally important is the altered balance of power in South Asia. While India has long been recognized as a big regional actor, Pakistan has also demonstrated enduring strategic resilience, emerging as a consequential middle power with substantial military and diplomatic capacity yet there is absolute gap in parity but quality overcome the quantity. Under conditions of nuclear deterrence, war is no longer a viable policy instrument. The logic of Mutually Assured Destruction reminds us that escalation between nuclear states risks catastrophic consequences for both.Why to wait and why to call it bluff.
Note: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Kashmir Media Service (KMS).
